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ABSTRACT
With a rapid growth in the IT industry, Internet of Things (IoT) has
gained a tremendous attention and become a central aspect of our
environment. In IoT the things (devices) communicate and exchange
the data without the act of human intervention. Such autonomy and
proliferation of IoT ecosystem make the devices more vulnerable
to attacks. In this paper, we propose a behavior monitor in IoT-
Blockchain setup which can provide trust-confidence to outside
networks. Behavior monitor extracts the activity of each device
and analyzes the behavior using deep auto-encoders. In addition,
we also incorporate Trusted Execution Technology (Intel SGX) in
order to provide a secure execution environment for applications
and data on blockchain. Finally, in evaluation we analyze three
IoT devices data that is infected by mirai attack. The evaluation
results demonstrate the ability of our proposed method in terms of
accuracy and time required for detection.
CCS CONCEPTS
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security; • Computer systems organization → peer-to-peer ar-
chitecture;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) is rapidly increasing and currently involved
in every field of our daily life. Industry leading experts argue that
more than 50 billion devices will be interconnected by 2020 [2].
These things are composed of web-enabled devices that use sen-
sors, embedded processors and communication hardware in order
to send/receive data from environments. As a result of such rich
communication, it generates a large volume of data in turn to use
for various dependent services.
Besides, IoT allows the evolution of several areas such as home
to smart-home, health-care to smart-health-care, cities to smart-
cities and many more. The key idea behind the IoT ecosystem is the
diversity of things which results in a huge number of devices. Each
device (physical or virtual), should be traceable and the generated
content/information can be retrievable by other users irrespective
of their locations [14]. Nevertheless, it is necessary that only au-
thorized users can be able to access and make use of the system.
Otherwise, it may become more prone to several security issues
such as information leakage, data modification and identity theft.
Furthermore, security issues remain a promising challenge in such
a large scale adoption of IoT system because of the reasons: (1)
Since most of communications between these devices are wireless
which make the system more vulnerable to different attacks, i.e.
eavesdropping, message tampering and mirai attack [4] etc. (2) De-
vices from different manufacturers have limited capacity in terms
of processing, battery, and memory that do not allow to implement
advance security solutions.
A number of solutions regarding security in IoT have been pro-
posed that offer the mainstream security requirements i.e. Confi-
dentiality, Integrity, Authentication or simply CIA [20]. However,
due to heterogeneity and resource-constraint devices, existing solu-
tions cannot fulfill the gap of security in such a huge expected IoT
system. Furthermore, some of solutions are although efficient and
secure but are often based on centralized mechanisms. For instance,
PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) faces scalability issues in case of
thousands number of nodes.
When it comes to decentralization, Block-chain (BC) technology
has gained an overwhelming attention in regard to addressing se-
curity, auditibility, anonymity and centralization. Ethereum [29]
a public blockchain was introduced in 2014 that deploys smart-
contracts for BC users in order to write and execute code in a
distributed way. Basically, BC is a decentralized ledger technology
where each operation is recorded in the form of a transaction i.e.
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CRUD (create, read, update, delete) in context of IoT. Any unautho-
rized access to data or any operations on the previously stored data
can, therefore, be detected. Moreover, smart contracts are used to
enforce certain access control mechanisms on the stored data. A
number of researchers put efforts to make BC technology suitable
for IoT use cases [12] [28] [8] [6] [27] [16] [10].
Problem Statement and Contribution:
As from various studies, it has been found that blockchain has
become a promising technology to meet upcoming IoT security
requirements [11]. Authors in [13] proposed a mechanism of decen-
tralized authentication in different zones of IoT systems. But the
limitation to this approach is: there is no device-level trust that can
prove any particular zone to external entities in case of supposing
the communication to occur between different IoT use-cases.
The contribution of this paper is two-fold:
(1) Proposed a Behavior Monitor in IoT-Blockchain infrastruc-
ture that can store IoT devices data and classifies behavior
(normal or malicious) in order to prevent attacks.
(2) To incorporate Trusted Execution Environment on a local
blockchain (i.e. Hyperledger) of each IoT-Zone that guaran-
tees the integrity and confidentiality of application code and
data.
Outline
Section 2 discussed background related to proposed framework. In
Section 3 some past efforts in the integration of IoT and Blockchain
are mentioned. Section 4 discusses the proposed architecture and all
its components in detail. In Section 5 we demonstrate some initial
results we have found while making experiments. Finally Section 6
concludes the proposed work and discusses the future work.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Blockchain
Blockchain technology was initially introduced and adopted by a
notably known cryptocurrency, Bitcoin [23]. BC is a decentralized
ledger technology that relies on a peer-to-peer network. Each node
in the BC network keeps an updated copy of ledger which can
prevent from a single point of failure. In the past few years, the
blockchain specifically functioning on cryptocurrencies [23] [7], i.e.
to avoid double spending problem. However, recently numerous
application areas have been explored where the blockchain can
be deployed to create and keep digital records (transactions) in a
distributed and secure way.
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Figure 1: Linked Blocks
The ledger in BC is consists of blocks and each block comprises
two parts. The first part represents the transaction or a fact (that
need to be stored in a database), which can be of any kind, such as
goods transaction, healthcare record, network traffic log etc. The
second part includes the header information, i.e. hash of transac-
tions, hash of previous hash, timestamp. Thus, storage in this way
makes a linked chain of sequenced blocks as shown in Figure 1.
Moreover, if a new transaction needs to add to BC, it will first add
to some block. Miners verify the block contain the transaction ac-
cording to defined rules. After verification, all miners perform a
consensus mechanism to validate the transactions. Finally, after
successful validation the verified transaction will be added to BC
ledger.
2.2 Blockchain and IoT Systems
IoT devices produced an enormous volume of data, which must be
stored and analyzed. For each IoT operation (create, update, delete,
read), the data can be registered in the form of transactions in the
BC-blocks. Identity information of IoT device can be registered
in a block such as manufacturer information and current status
where the device is in use. Smart-contracts are used to apply access
control policies for IoT devices which means that any unautho-
rized access to a device can be therefore detected. There is no need
of centralized mechanisms for storage, such as cloud, for IoT pro-
tection. Blockchain provides data authenticity and prevent from
unauthorized access. BC can also enable a secure way of messaging
between IoT devices. Exchange of messages can be treated like
financial transactions flow in crypto-currencies e.g. Bitcoin [23].
2.3 Blockchain Security Solutions for IoT
The decentralized and distributed nature of blockchain makes it a
promising solution for IoT security. IoTwith integration in blockchain
enable a higher security level, which otherwise could not be achieved
by any other technology or nearly impossible. Some of recent pro-
posed solutions in terms of IoT security with blockchains are as
follows:
In [18], authors proposed a blockchain based solution for IoT
device control and configurations using Ethereum. A unique key-
pair (Public & Private) is assigned to every device. The private
key is stored inside device, while the public key is registered as a
transaction in the blockchain. An IoT device can then be reached
through Ethernet using its public key. Thus, it is concluded that the
management of IoT devices via blockchain is possible.
A solution proposed in [21], which make use of blockchain for
secure firmware updates in IoT devices where traffic directly to
the network server is replaced by local peers of the blockchain
nodes. The manufacturer is supposed to store the hashes of updated
versions of firmware on the blockchain which can be accessible to
all the IoT nodes.
IoT devices related to medical are also subjected to the same
security and privacy concerns. A medical IoT system must be attack
resistant and reliable enough. User safety and privacy in this case is
very crucial. A user must be protected from any malfunction caused
by a security incident or faulty device. Blockchain can overcome the
risk of device malfunction by immutable ledger of records. Nichol et
al. [25] proposed the applicability of BC in order to ensure reliability
in medical IoT devices. Upon a device is produced and deployed, a
hash of unique ID along with the other relevant information such
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as manufacturer name, are stored in BC. Later, this data will be
updated with patient history, doctor name and hospital information.
The doctors and patients can be automatically notified about the
device status, i.e. expiring battery, patient health irregularities.
2.4 Blockchain & Trusted Execution
Environment (TEEs)
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) [3][1] have been utilized
to strengthen security and performance in the blockchain protocol.
TEEs provide confidentiality and integrity of the application code
in a system, until and unless the CPU is not compromised by an
intruder physically. TEEs also support remote attestation [19], that
allows remote parties to verify the health of software with genuine
TEE.
Intel provided TEEs functionality in Software Guard Extension
(SGX) [3]. SGX is a set of CPU instructions inside Intel’s x86 proces-
sor design which can allow to create an isolated environment for
the execution of selected pieces of code in protected areas called
enclaves. These enclaves are designed to run software in a trustwor-
thy way, even on a system (host) where the operating system and
memory are untrusted. There are three main functions of enclaves
which are isolation, sealing and attestation. A short description are
as follows:
• Isolation: Data and code inside the enclave memory are pro-
tected and cannot be read or altered by any external process.
• Sealing: Data supposed to send to host environment should
be encrypted and authenticated with a seal key.
• Attestation: Remote parties are allowed to verify an applica-
tion enclave identity, credentials and other data.
2.5 Threat Model
The threat model for this research are as follows:
• The proposed solutionwill work on permissioned blockchain
with trusted execution technology enabled systems.
• Trusted execution environment (TEE) is considered as a
root-of-trust so the TEE, CPU and hashing algorithm are
considered trusted.
• Network between IoT devices to the behavior monitor sys-
tem is considered secure. No assumptions are made about
software running alongside the behavior monitor. There can
be any number of malwares trying to exploit the transactions
by IoT devices in the internal network.
3 RELATEDWORK
Currently, several researchers show interest in the integration of
blockchain and IoT ecosystems. Very few of them are related to help
IoT security requirements. This section outlines some of the past
research efforts that intend to realize such integration particularly
for security needs.
Dorri et al.[12] deploy blockchain based architecture for smart-
home setting. Their approach consists of three different blockchain
networks: a local-BC (private) for every use case, a share BC (pri-
vate) and overlay BC (public). Although this solution solves the
issue of identification, but still it has some limitations like: (1) For
each operations it happened to create at least 8 communication
links that can flood the network easily in case of high activity of IoT
devices. (2) Local BC’s are centralized and not distributed which is
opposite to the main principal of BC - a decentralized technology.
In [26], authors study existing solutions regarding access con-
trol systems and argue that these systems are not effective in the
domain of IoT because of its expected growth from millions to
billions of devices. In order to get rid of centralized mechanisms,
this proposed solution implements capability and access control
as a component in a blockchain infrastructure. The other compo-
nents are: data management protocol, messaging service and data
storage system. The messaging service ensures the exchange of
access control message between two parties with defined roles. The
messaging service then send the request to a data storage system,
where it is stored as a block. Finally, the receiving entity fetches
the message from the BC block using the messaging service. They
further defined four roles, i.e. data source, data owner, requester
and endorser.
Hardjono et al.[15] propose a privacy preserving mechanism
called chainanchor for authorizing IoT devices in the cloud net-
work. It helps device-owner being rewarded when selling their
device data to a service provider and ensure a privacy preserving
communication between service provider and device-owner. But
this approach is not suitable in most IoT use-cases, because the
main objective of this approach is full anonymity and IoT devices
sometime need device identification.
Patrick et al. [13] propose a decentralized authentication scheme
for IoT devices. In this approach they declare virtual zones such
as smart-home zone, healthcare zone, for robust identification of
smart-devices. Each zone has a group master who is responsible to
create a groupID and communicate with blockchain. Each device
or follower in a zone gets a ticket signed by their respective zone
master. When a device or follower want to start a transaction, it
will first send an association request signed by private-key to their
respective zone master. Upon receiving the request, blockchain
verifies the integrity with the follower public key. Then the follower
ticket is verified using the master public key. If the ticket is valid,
BC stores the association, i.e. groupID with followerID for further
correspondence, otherwise discarded. However, the shortcoming of
this approach is that there is no trust-level integrity measurement
of each zone devices in order to prove it to the outside community.
To summarize, majority of all these current researches follows
the same security mechanism provided in existing BC technologies
i.e. Bitcoin [23], Ethereum [29] etc. However, there is no awareness
towards device level trust that means to know about the device
state (benign or malicious).
4 PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE
The main goal of the proposed architecture (cf. Figure 3) is to add a
layer of security for behavior monitoring of various IoT-zones in a
blockchain setup. As discussed in [13], authors declare zones for
different use-cases of IoT, however, they do not consider the devices
itself in case of compromised behavior. Furthermore, there is no
mechanism that can show the level-of-trust for each zone when
an external entity needs to know before communication. In this
research, we enhance the said scheme and add a behavior monitor
on each zone. A separate local-BC is configured on each zone that
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Figure 2: IoT secure behavior capturing and storage mecha-
nism
is used to store the activity of each zone and provides the trust-
level confidence to outside entities. All kinds of communications
between devices are considered as transactions and must be passed
through the blockchain for validation. For example, if Node A need
to send message to Node B, then A must first send the message
to blockchain. If BC validate and authenticate the message from
A, then B is finally allowed to read the message. The proposed
architecture follows the same procedure of devices initialization
and system functioning discussed in [13]. For brevity, we discuss a
brief description in the following section.
4.1 Initialization & System Functioning
In the first phase of deployment, one device from each zone is des-
ignated as a Main or Master node which can be considered as a
certification authority (CA). Any node can be defined as a master,
but in this case, we assigned to the node that is more resource
capable and powerful. All the other nodes in each zone are known
as follower. Every Master node creates a groupID and send a signed
ticket to each follower for identification. For the first transaction
of any follower, it must require authentication. After that, an asso-
ciation of the follower and master are stored in the BC for future
correspondence. For more detail about the initialization and system
functioning we refer the reader to [13].
4.2 Local Blockchain Setup
A local blockchain is deployed on every zone and populated with
the hashes of transactions generated from IoT devices. Hyperledger
Fabric [7] is chosen as a local BC, we discussed the details of fab-
ric with IoT in our previous work [6]. For prototyping, we use
the dataset [5] of IoT traffic collected from various sensor com-
munication. For each communication between devices or nodes, a
transaction is created and stored in the local BC. Note that in most
of the existing BC technologies, actual data of IoT devices are not
stored in the BC due to processing overheads.
In each zone a single device having more computational power
than others, acts as a master or main node. Once the number of
transactions reaches to a pre-define blocksize, the master node
creates a new block and append it to local BC. Afterwards, we
incorporate Intel SGX [3] as a root-of-trust on top of BC in order to
ensure that the execution of code and applications are trusted. As
shown in Figure 2, the Intel SGX-enabled application is composed of
trusted and untrusted part. For sensitive operations i.e. encryption,
hashing, a trusted-function is called. The function returns, and the
data inside the trusted part (enclave) remains in trusted memory
and are not accessible to external entities. Moreover, implementing
SGX technology over blockchain allows the proposed scheme to:
• Protect the applications running on BC and data protection
that cannot be accessed by the execution host.
• Make sure that the application/data on BC is expected and
correct.
• Protect end-to-end privacy of application result, which can-
not allow others to inspect but the user.
• Provide a BC-based validation by verifying the applications
inside enclave is neither tampered nor interrupted by any
node in BC.
• Make sure the application and execution results are valid,
and not tampered or fabricated by any malicious node.
4.3 Behavior Monitor
The main goal of this research is to integrate our own custom be-
havior monitor that can classify the behavior of every device and
compute a level-of-trust on each zone. As mentioned earlier, that
all the nodes (followers) in a specific zone do their operations (read,
write) via master/main node. The scheme in Figure 3 depicts our
proposed approach with all the entities in detail. Data or transac-
tions from nodes is considered as a behavior of that particular node.
Master node is a device that centrally processes all the incoming
and outgoing transactions to and from a zone.
Whenever a data is received by the master node from the fol-
lower node, the master node stores the data in behavior monitor
and append the corresponding hash to the ledger in blockchain. A
sequence-ID (SEQ-ID) is assigned to each transaction while storing
in behavior monitor, and a Hash-ID (H-ID) is assigned to the cor-
responding hash in BC, for reference. Finally, a machine learning
strategy is used to actively monitor the incoming data and classify
them as normal or malicious.
For analysis and detection of behavior we rely on deep auto-
encoders [17] [24] for IoT devices, which is trained from statistical
correlation features extracted from benign data. The process of
behavior detection and monitoring consists of the following stages.
(1) Data collection (2) Feature extraction (3) Training model (4)
Continuous Monitoring.
4.3.1 Data Collection. At this point, we refer to the dataset [5]
that has been collected from various sensors in IoT network. In
real-time, in order to ensure that the training data is clean and not
malicious, normal traffic from IoT devices are collected immediately
after its installation to the network.
4.3.2 Feature Extraction. Whenever data from IoT device arrives,
a behavioral snapshot of the protocols and host related to data are
stored in our behavior monitor. The snapshot contains different
parameters, i.e. source IP, destination IP, MAC-address and port
number, etc. We use the same set of features mentioned in the
dataset for real time detection of malicious activities in IoT devices.
For example, when a compromised node in a zone spoof an IP,
then the features aggregated from the source-IP, destination-IP
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Figure 3: Proposed IoT Blockchain Architecture
and MAC-Address will immediately mark as malicious because of
unseen activity from the respective spoofs IP.
4.3.3 Training Model. As our baseline model for behavior detec-
tion, we use deep auto-encoders that can build and maintain a
learning model on each zone of IoT use-cases. An auto-encoder is
a type of neural network, which is trained to re-organize the data
after some sort of compression. The compression makes sure that
the model learns meaningful concepts and the correlation between
different set of features. For training purposes, we use two sets of
data which consists of only benign (normal) data. The first dataset
is a training dataset (TDS ) which is used to train the auto-encoder
by declaring input parameters such as learning rate (lrn , size of
gradient descent step), and epochs (number of iterations through
TDS ). The second dataset OptDS (Optimization Dataset) is used
to optimize the above hyper-parameters (lrn & epochs) iteratively
until the mean square error (MSE) function between the input
and output stop decreasing. This stopping prevents overfitting in
TDS and helping in better detection results with future data. Later
on, (OptDS ) is used to segregate between normal and malicious
activities and false positive rate (FPR).
After the model training and optimization is completed, thresh-
old value (thv ) is set by which an instance of data is considered
malicious. Empirically, it is calculated as the sum of the sample
mean and std_deviation ofMSE on OptDS (see Equation).
thv = MSEOptDS + s(MSEOptDS )
4.3.4 Continuous Monitoring. Finally, the model is applied to con-
tinuously observe the data and to label each instance as a normal
or malicious. Consequently, an alert against anomalous behavior
can be issued in order to indicate the IoT device is malicious.
5 EVALUATION
In our experiments, we use a real-time dataset available in [5], for
realizing the framework. The dataset contains both the benign and
malicious (attacked) data. The data we choose from the dataset
belongs to three different devices, i.e. Ecobee-thermostat, Webcam
and Security-camera. For training and optimization, we use ten-
sorflow and keras libraries in python language. An auto-encoder
make an input layer whose dimension is the same as the number
of features in the dataset i.e. 115.
After training we apply a famous attack (mirai) to compute
the detection time and accuracy of our model in comparison with
other algorithms commonly used for anomaly detection. The same
benign dataset is used to train three other algorithms: SVM (support
vector machine), Isolation forest and LOF (Local Outlier Factor). Our
method shows 99.8% results in terms of TPR (True positive Rate) and
fewer FPR (False positive Rate). Furthermore, as evident in Figure 4
SVM and LOF have almost similar TPR value and found much better
than the isolation forest. Next, we evaluate the average detection
time for each algorithm as depicted in Figure 5. The detection time
of all the three devices in our case is lower than the others.
The deep auto-encoders dominate on all the selected devices
in terms of TPR, FPR and detection time. This is because of the
ability in auto-encoders to learn approximate complex functions
and non-linear structure mapping [22].
Moreover, as shown in Figure 5, our technique requiredmuch less
time than the other algorithms which is approximately 170±220ms
(milliseconds) to detect the attacks. This means that the launch
attack could be detected or alerted in less than a second and thus
considers as a substantial reduction in a typical time required for
DDOS attacks [9].
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this research, we analyze device level trust in IoT-Blockchain
Infrastructure. A smart-home setting is used as a use-case for realiz-
ing the proposed idea. A Local Blockchain on each zone is deployed
that can store every traffic coming from their follower (nodes) in
the form of transactions. Behavior Monitor is defined and config-
ured on the Main/Master node of each zone, which can capture
and analyze the activity of IoT devices. We apply a deep learning
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strategy (auto-encoders) on the behavior monitor to classify the
device and make a level-of-trust. Furthermore, we incorporate Intel
SGX technology as a root-of-trust over the blockchain to provide
security for sensitive code and applications. Finally, the evaluation
of our study shows its ability to mitigate the mainstream security
requirements and resilience to attacks.
This research is our preliminary step towards classification of
devices in IoT-Blockchain framework. Our future plan is to investi-
gate a comparative study of other machine learning approaches for
better performances and accuracy. Another goal would be to apply
the framework to other application areas of IoT domain and analyze
the outcomes. Finally, we will provide a full implementation on
various IoT devices datasets and technical details about the Intel
SGX implementation.
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